![]() “Submarines are worth it for their strategic strike, intelligence collection and special operations support capabilities, as well as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare. “Some doubt the value of submarines, often because they only think of submarines in the context of open warfare,” he says. Rudd says the proposal for the new submarines was a “realistic assessment of China’s evolving strategic posture in our region, particularly the South China Sea”. This was the year Beijing announced its expansive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, which was the beginning of its drive to militarise the disputed waterway by building naval bases on artificial reefs. The proposal for 12 new submarines first appeared in the 2009 Defence White Paper, and was championed by then-prime minister Kevin Rudd. ![]() With the first future submarine not projected to arrive until 2035, and the frigate just two years earlier, Defence’s warning is bleak. It warned the country no longer had a 10-year window to build its defences. Last year’s Defence Strategic Update said the “prospect of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, while still unlikely, is less remote than in the past”. In Minchin’s view, the rot set way back in the 1980s, as a bipartisan view formed that Defence’s major acquisitions must be built in Australia.Ĭhina’s growing assertiveness across a number of flashpoints – the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea or East China Sea – has increased the chance of conflict breaking out on the high seas. The government this year announced an 18-month delay to the $45 billion Future Frigate program, meaning the first frigate will not be in service until 2033. Despite this, based on international benchmarks, the Collins fleet is now seen as a well-performing fleet in terms of availability.Īnd it’s not just submarines where there are inherent problems. ![]() The transition from the Oberons to Collins was badly botched – the first Collins was commissioned to the Royal Australian Navy in 1996, 18 months behind schedule. But it’s worth asking: would we have arrived at this point regardless of which bidder we chose? After all, Defence’s acquisition debacles are not confined to French-designed submarines. And with French builder Naval Group’s cost blowouts, schedule slippages and dubious commitments on meeting local content requirements – it’s been an easy sport. In the current debate on Australia’s submarine debacle, French-bashing has been all the rage. Despite the fact former prime minister Tony Abbott promised the first of the submarines would be in the water by the mid-2020s, it is now not scheduled to become operational until the mid-2030s. According to the latest projections they will now cost about $90 billion to build and $145 billion to maintain over their life cycle. Almost every National Security Committee meeting, Cabinet meeting, Expenditure Review Committee meeting that I was involved in – the issue of submarines came in.”Īustralia’s 12 new attack-class submarines – Australia’s largest military acquisition in its history – were originally slated to cost between $40 billion and $50 billion. “We had enormous issues with the Collins. ![]() “The cost of maintaining the Collins submarines has always been significantly beyond any sort of budget that Defence had contemplated. “I was staggered by that, no wonder we ran into financial difficulties with Defence’s estimates of maintaining and operating these things,” Minchin tells The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. One defence official told the then-finance minister they assumed the cost of maintaining the previous generation of submarines, the Oberons - built in the 1950s and 70s - would be the proper basis for calculating the cost of the Collins. Minchin asked senior Defence officials how they came up with the estimate. Nick Minchin was responsible for ASC, the company that built the Collins submarines, in the Howard government. By that stage, the submarines were costing taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars a year to maintain. Shortly after taking over the portfolio, Minchin noticed the original projections for the cost of maintaining and operating the Swedish-designed submarines seemed significantly out of step with reality. He has seen it all before.Īs finance minister for six years in the Howard government, Minchin was responsible for the taxpayer-funded company ASC, which built Australia’s six Collins-class submarines between 19. Nick Minchin isn’t surprised Australia’s future submarines are arriving later than expected and $40 billion more expensive. Normal text size Larger text size Very large text size
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